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LEGAL THINKING: ITS LIMITS AND TENSIONS. By William E Read. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1986. Pp. ix, 189. 
$23.95. 
William E. Read's1 Legal Thinking is a comprehensive work out-
lining the interaction between different types of thought processes 
within the context of the legal system. 2 Read's analysis focuses on the 
actors within the legal system; he examines the perspectives of those 
responsible for the development, management, and operation of the 
legal system, from the law-breakers to the law-makers. 3 His thought-
ful analysis will help the reader to understand her impact as a partici-
pant in the legal system, and will help her anticipate her impact on its 
growth. Legal Thinking is well written and well worth reading. 
Read divides his discussion into two sections: the systemic limits 
imposed on the legal thought process, and the tensions created by the 
interaction of these limits when the actor brings other factors into the 
legal process. In part 1 of this two-part book, Read outlines the limi-
tations of the tools of legal analysis, starting with the most important: 
the perspective of the thinker. Read establishes five perspectives: sub-
jects, officials, advisors, legislators, and scholars.4 As he describes 
these perspectives, he demonstrates how the position of the thinker 
1. William E. Read, A.B. 1938, Hamilton College; LL.B. 1941, Harvard University, is Pro-
fessor Emeritus at the University of Louisville School of Law. He has taught Jurisprudence, 
Legal Method, and Conflict of Laws. A former corporate lawyer, he has also published CORPO-
RATE OFFICER'S AND DIRECTOR'S DESK BOOK (1980). 
2. Read's definition of the legal system includes the process that generates and applies legal 
norms. A legal norm is 
a statement, legal because it is backed by a government, and normative because it is about 
what ought to be. We do legal thinking when we think about at least one arguably legal 
norm and how it connects with a fact relevant to the norm's identity, meaning, applicability, 
or application. I use legal norms rather than legal rules in order to encompass "ought" 
statements not ordinarily called rules - such as legal principles and methods, and legally 
binding promises. 
P. 2. 
3. It is interesting to note that while Read gives thoughtful treatment to legal scholars in his 
perspectives analysis, he considers legal scholars to be merely commentators and not participants 
in the legal system. One could argue with the validity of that distinction, since the comments of 
both professors and students oflaw, through publication, are often the impetus for the promulga-
tion of new legal norms, and the basis for decisions interpreting already existing norms. 
4. Read means these to be broad categories: "(l) the subjects to whom the law applies, (2) the 
officials who apply the Jaw to others, (3) those who advise others about legal problems, (4) the 
legislators who make new legal norms, and (5) the legal scholars who teach and write about the 
Jaw." Pp. 2-3. The actor's job will allow for different perspectives within a given category. For 
example, Read's category of officials includes judges, those responsible for law enforcement, ad-
ministrators, and ministers. The different duties of each job creates unique perspectives for each 
type of official. Pp. 12-13. Read also recognizes overlap in roles: for instance, a judge caught 
speeding on her way to a class she teaches part-time at a Jaw school might simultaneously be an 
official, a scholar, and a subject. However, in a perspectives analysis we should only look to her 
dominant role at the moment, as the subject of a speeding ordinance. 
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within the legal system determines the approach she will take to a 
legal problem. For instance, the more personal the issue, the greater 
the thinker's tendency to conduct an individualized assessment of the 
legal norms that she may or may not decide to abide by in any given 
situation. Acting as a subject, she brings into her analysis the particu-
lar facts of her individual position, including moral and benefit-over-
loss determinations. Read's discussion of perspectives allows the 
reader to compare how other actors will now approach the conse-
quences of a subject's decision. For example, judges and other officials 
are burdened with the responsibility of maintaining the integrity of the 
system. Because that burden is a societal one, the officials look to 
more generalized interpretations and applications of norms and facts. 
Thus, many of the factors that the subject thinks are important are not 
part of the officials' calculation at all. 
A paradox is therefore created: a subject, the whole focus of a 
legal norm, will examine the choice of norms with a less restricted 
perspective than that of the official faced with the consequences of that 
subject's actions. One of Read's examples clearly highlights the im-
portance of perspective. It centers on a familiar type of ordinance: a 
speed limit (pp. 62-67). A driver may decide whether to observe the 
speed limit using a personalized analysis, such as whether she is in a 
hurry; or perhaps her decision will be keyed into an emotion, such as 
tension or anger. 5 The police officer stopping the driver mechanically 
applies a norm which has already evaluated the importance of strict 
enforcement as a deterrent to reckless driving. 6 To the officer Mary 
Jones is known only as Speeding Driver, and all of Mary Jones's 
problems should be irrelevant.7 In this way, characterizations of posi-
tion and perspective are the pivotal points of legal analysis and conse-
quently of Legal Thinking. 
Part 1 's discussion of the limitations on legal thought created by 
the legal system also canvasses the limitations of the norms to be ap-
plied to the facts at issue. Norms include the rules currently being 
enforced by the government, legal principles such as due process, and 
legal methods such as strict scrutiny (pp. 25-26). "Normal" limits in-
5. We can obviously imagine other factors. Can she afford another speeding ticket? How 
will another citation affect her insurance rates? How important is it for her to reach her destina-
tion quickly? 
6. Of course, this is the perfect case. Read only briefly considers how the officer's analysis 
might be influenced by politics, such as local pressure to cut down on speeding, departmental 
quotas, or the officer's personal prejudices regarding the race, age, aflluence or attractiveness of 
the driver. Read casually labels these factors "complications." P. 66. It is possible that these 
are intended to be part of the tensions analysis Read undertakes in part 2, but none seem to fit in 
the categories of tensions outlined in that part. 
7. Read fails to carry his example through in one regard: sometimes the system itself takes 
into account the subject's own evaluation. Thus, Speeding Driver is further classified into Speed· 
ing Doctor going to a patient, or Speeding Husband with wife in labor. These subjects may be 
excused by a norm, or by another decisionmaker in the system. 
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elude the necessary existence of a norm, its enforceability, and the lee-
way allowed in the norm's interpretation and application as 
determined by the perspective of the party conducting the analysis. 
For example, a judge cannot declare a subject's action illegal unless a 
rule exists that declares it illegal. Even then, the enforceability of the 
rule may be suspect on constitutional grounds. To bring the example 
to its conclusion: in making a determination of constitutionality, the 
court has some discretion in deciding on a method of analysis (the 
choice between strict and low-level scrutiny, for example) and in de-
termining how the standard applies in a given case. 
Perhaps the easiest limitation to understand is the factual limita-
tion. The scope of a personal injury lawsuit is shaped by determina-
tions of who ran into whom, whether one of the drivers was drinking, 
and other factual issues (p. 32). Facts such as these will largely deter-
mine the outcome when the norm - negligence - is applied. Read 
classifies all of the limits described in part 1 as "objective" or "struc-
tural" - how the system applies pressure on those acting within it to 
respect the legal norms. How well does the system work? No matter 
how well any system is designed, problems are inevitable. Read de-
votes the last chapter in part 1 to examples of problems in legal think-
ing. These problems do not arise in the abstract; if the system is not 
responding correctly, or not addressing the proper issues, greater pres-
sure is put on the actor making the decision to adjust the process. 
In Read's hypothesis, the status of a legal norm may cause 
problems in the decisionmaking process. A good example is the abso-
lute nature of a speed limit, a definitional problem. Does driving one 
mile-per-hour over the limit warrant a citation? This is a question 
both subjects and officials will consider in deciding whether to abide 
by the norm. 8 The pressure in these types of circumstances is to look 
to extra-norm sources for guidance. Read gives the actor three ques-
tions to ask: Why was the norm made? How was the norm made? 
What has happened since the norm was made?9 
The discretion given actors to resolve these types of issues creates 
an underlying tension in the system. How the actor can and should 
resolve these issues is the subject of part 2 of Legal Thinking. 10 Read 
uses the term "subjective tensions": these tensions result from the in-
8. P. 48. Presumably the legislature has answered this question affirmatively by using an 
absolute standard. Some pressure is taken off the subject and official by the system of different 
types of tickets for different levels of violation. 
9. Pp. 53-56. The reader should add to this list two important underlying questions: Who 
should make these types of evaluations? Under what circumstances? 
10. In summary, the obligations of officials to offer good reasons for their decisions en-
courage them to respect legal norms. At the same time, these obligations may also encourage 
officials to see themselves as free to interpret and to apply (or not apply) norms in light of what 
seems sensible or fair. This paradox leads to the tensions in the legal thought processes that are 
the concern of the second part of the book. 
1478 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1475 
terplay of the objective limitations and the legal freedom afforded to 
the actor by the system to choose, evaluate, and make other subjective 
judgments when coming to a legal determination. 
Read examines three relationships: structure-freedom tension, 
law-morals tension, and norm-fact tension. Structural tensions arise 
most commonly when the structure requires, allows, or encourages the 
application of the actor's own judgment. There is also tension when a 
legal norm to be applied is morally unacceptable to the actor either 
generally or in particular fact situations. Finally, norm-fact tensions 
arise when an actor, primarily a subject, considers the impact of a 
norm on a particular interest or value. The important link between 
the sections is the perspectives analysis, which acts as the key to un-
derstanding the moral perspective, actionable discretion, and decision-
making capacity of the actor. 
The discussion of tensions, though it represents the bulk of Read's 
analysis, has less impact on the reader than Read's outline of the legal 
system. The purpose of part 2 is to put the human factor back into the 
analysis of the legal system: the identities of Mary Jones and Officer 
Smith, and how those identities affect legal decisionmaking according 
to their current role in the decision process, their individual moral 
evaluations, and the facts at their disposal. It is unfortunate that at 
the same time that Read emphasizes the human element, he retreats 
into the realm of the abstract. There are fewer examples in part 2, and 
those that are included are abrupt and wordy .11 A thoughtful exami-
nation of the Warren Court's struggle with segregation, for example, 
would highlight all three types of tensions, and would be interesting 
and current, as well as highly pertinent. While Read uses this example 
(p. 120), it is only one of many treated rather summarily in the law 
and morajs chapter. 
However, Read is to be commended for his restraint. In his dis-
cussion of tensions, he is descriptive only; he makes no judgments as to 
how the tensions should be resolved, but only points out their exist-
ence. He also refrains from making a sweeping assessment of how 
often these tensions arise and where the user typically looks for resolu-
tion. The reader is free to hypothesize about whether a legal decision 
will be influenced by the personal experience of the actor, by social 
policy, or by some other source.12 
The strength of Legal Thinking is the simple structure of Read's 
theory and his conscious avoidance of pontification. Of course, a book 
devoted to tensions of legal thought must generate its own brand of 
11. This problem only exacerbates Read's reliance on his own specialized vocabulary; more 
and clearer examples would help the reader to keep in mind the particularized meanings Read 
has given some common terms. Pp. 3-5. 
12. If the reader is a Legal Realist, then every source contributes to the actor's response to 
legal problems, all of the time, to the detriment of the legal system. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
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paradox and tension: despite its brevity, the strength of Legal Think-
ing is the warm, detailed examples found in Read's description of the 
legal system, which bring to his theory a vibrancy not often found in 
legal writing. 
In his introduction, Read states that his goal was originally to as-
sist beginning law students in understanding how legal thinking differs 
from other thought processes (pp. 1-2). At some point, though, Read 
escalated his endeavor to a comprehensive reevaluation of legal think-
ing. From the beginning student's point of view, this focus shift is 
unfortunate; many of the concepts Read describes will take on mean-
ing only after some experience with them. Still, even the beginning 
student should appreciate how Read outlines, quite nicely, old puzzles 
("the evils of judicial legislation"), gives insight from all perspectives 
to complexities new to us all ("the complexities of highway speed-
ing"), and highlights his effort with meaningful examples. While the 
more sophisticated reader13 will find part 2 heavy going, if she is will-
ing to supplement Read's discussions with her own experiences, the 
analysis will nonetheless help her better understand the legal process 
in which we all participate. Legal Thinking is worthwhile reading for 
a wide range of readers. 
-Marcella David 
13. Included in this category are practitioners, professors, those immersed in bureaucracy, 
and, of course, upper-level law students. 
